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The “Innocence Penalty”: Is it More
Pronounced for Juveniles?
Nilam A. Sanghvi & Elizabeth A. DeLosa*
ABSTRACT
Despite the presumption of innocence, we know that indi-
viduals accused of crimes are punished for maintaining their in-
nocence in ways both tangible and intangible as they make their
way through our criminal justice system.  For example, even if
instructed not to, jurors may infer guilt from a defendant’s failure
to testify; defendants who exercise their right to go to trial re-
ceive lengthier sentences if convicted than those who plead
guilty; and, once convicted, defendants who maintain their inno-
cence are often denied opportunities for parole or clemency.
This article explores whether these “innocence penalties” are
even greater for children who are accused of crimes and comes to
the preliminary view that the answer is yes.  The main focus of
the juvenile system is on redemption and rehabilitation, concepts
that assume guilt.  This article seeks to promote conversation
about this important topic and create more room for the consid-
eration of innocence in the juvenile system.
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INTRODUCTION
“A defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven to
be guilty beyond a doubt that would cause a reasonable and sensi-
ble person to hesitate in a matter of great importance to him or
her.”1
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . . . .”2
The oft-quoted presumption of innocence and privilege against
self-incrimination are the bedrock principles of the American crimi-
nal justice system.  However, despite the maxim that you are inno-
cent until proven guilty, it is no secret that those who choose to
maintain their innocence are penalized for doing so at many points
in their journey through the system.  When asked to consider issues
related to juveniles and wrongful convictions for this symposium,
we wondered whether children making their way through the juve-
nile justice system face even more negative consequences for main-
taining their innocence than adults do.3  While this question needs
much further study, our preliminary view is that the answer is, un-
fortunately, yes, due in large part to the juvenile justice system’s
focus on acceptance of responsibility and amenability to treatment.
I. WHAT IS THE “INNOCENCE PENALTY”?
For purposes of this piece, we use the term “innocence pen-
alty” to describe the various ways—both tangible and intangible—
that individuals accused of crimes are punished for maintaining
their innocence.  These penalties vary and occur before, during, and
after conviction.  We provide just a few examples here as context
for this discussion.
There are multiple ways in which an accused person who
chooses to go to trial, and therefore insists on the presumption of
innocence, may be punished for making that choice.  Perhaps the
most significant punishment is the trial penalty—”individuals who
chose to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial face expo-
nentially higher sentences if they invoke the right to trial and
1. PBI, PA. SUGGESTED STD. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.01 (3d ed. 2019).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich & Reveka Y. Shteynberg, To Plead or Not to
Plead: A Comparison of Juvenile and Adult True and False Plea Decisions, 49 L. &
HUM. BEHAVIOR 611, 612 (2016) (internal citations omitted) (“Research has con-
sistently demonstrated that juveniles are less active participants in legal cases and
possess inadequate legal knowledge and understanding.  In comparison to adults,
juveniles aged 15 and younger have deficits in their legal understanding, knowl-
edge, and decision-making capabilities.”).
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lose.”4  According to a study by the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, United States Sentencing Commission data
on federal sentencing shows that, “[i]n 2015, in most primary of-
fense categories, the average post-trial sentence was more than
triple the average post-plea sentence.”5  In one extreme example, a
Pennsylvania Innocence Project client was offered an 18-month
plea deal; he chose to go to trial, was convicted, and was sentenced
to 3 life-without-parole sentences.  This phenomenon means that
even innocent people will plead guilty because they decide that go-
ing to trial is too much of a risk.6  Of the 2,755 individuals currently
listed in the National Registry of Exonerations, 569 (just over 20
percent) pleaded guilty.7
There are other less tangible, but we believe equally real, pen-
alties as well.  For example, even though they should not, jurors
likely do draw adverse inferences when defendants do not testify in
their own defense at trial.  Although a no-adverse-inference jury
instruction exists, a defense attorney may fail to request it.  And,
even if given, studies show that jurors do not always follow instruc-
tions and often have trouble understanding them.8
The penalties for maintaining innocence continue after convic-
tion and, arguably, become even worse.  Convicted individuals who
maintain their innocence are often de facto blocked from obtaining
release from prison or clemency.  The Pennsylvania Parole Hand-
book unequivocally tells parole applicants that, at their parole in-
terviews, they “need to take responsibility for [their] crime(s).”9
And, although the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons is becoming
more open to clemency applications from applicants who maintain
their innocence, historically, an emphasis has also been placed on
acceptance of responsibility for individuals applying for a pardon or
commutation of sentence.  Indeed, Pennsylvania’s clemency appli-
cation assumes applicants were involved in the crime.  It asks: “De-
4. NACDL, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL
ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018).
5. Id. at 15.
6. Id. at 6.
7. See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://bit.ly/2ORkMF0 [https://
perma.cc/H78F-JEN5] (last visited Mar. 26, 2021).
8. See Vida B. Johnson, Presumed Fair? Voir Dire on the Fundamentals of
Our Criminal Justice System, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 545, 556 (2015).
9. PA. DEP’T OF CORR. & PA. PAROLE BD., UNDERSTAND THE PROCESS:
YOUR PAROLE HANDBOOK 14 (2021), https://bit.ly/3vpaJI7 [https://perma.cc/
N2U5-BW7K].
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scribe the incident and how you were involved.  Where were you,
what exactly did you do, and how were you caught?”10
II. ARE CHILDREN INVOLVED IN THE JUVENILE SYSTEM
SUBJECTED TO THE INNOCENCE PENALTY AT EVEN
MORE POINTS THROUGHOUT THEIR EXPOSURE TO
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM?
Children involved in the juvenile justice system are subject to
the same “innocence penalty” discussed above, and they may en-
counter it at even more critical points than adults involved in the
criminal justice system.  This question deserves further examina-
tion, but we point to several areas—the process of transferring ju-
venile cases to and from adult courts, the plea-bargaining process,
and re-sentencings for “juvenile lifers”—in which innocent children
may suffer more in the justice system.  We offer a case study to try
to illustrate the impact these issues potentially have in a real-life
scenario.
Case Example:
Meet Michael Smith, a 17-year-old who has never been in any
serious trouble with the law.  Once, last year, school police caught
him and his friends sharing a can of beer at a high school football
game.  They were charged with underage possession of alcohol and
given a fine.  Michael’s family could not afford to pay, so he worked
off the fine by completing 50 hours of community service at a local
soup kitchen.  Michael is mostly interested in sports, girls, and
hanging out with his four closest friends.  He hopes to attend Penn
State next year on a baseball scholarship; without one, he cannot
afford college.
Last Friday during school, one of Michael’s friends got into a
fist fight with another student.  Michael was not there but heard
about the fight later that day.  The story going around school was
that Michael’s friend started the fight, but the other boy was much
bigger and easily took control.  Michael’s friend suffered a broken
nose, a concussion that caused unconsciousness, two broken ribs,
and a collapsed lung.  He was taken to the hospital in an ambulance
and admitted in serious but stable condition.  Michael was upset
about his friend’s injuries.  Other students saw him talking excitedly
with two other close friends; all three boys reportedly left school
early.
10. PA. BD. OF PARDONS, PA. CLEMENCY APPLICATION PACKET 8 (n.d.),
https://bit.ly/3s5GumR [https://perma.cc/2GXA-53AF].
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Later that night, the boy Michael’s friend fought with was ac-
costed and dragged from school to the basketball court by three un-
known assailants in ski masks.  The assailants did not say anything;
they beat the boy severely with baseball bats.  He was rushed to the
local hospital, but he died a few days later from internal bleeding
caused by blunt force trauma.  Police were called, the boy’s death
was ruled a homicide, and the investigation began.
Police soon learned about the fist fight that had occurred a few
days before.  They also learned that the deceased had caused substan-
tial injuries to another boy during that fight.  Witnesses told police
that they saw Michael and two other boys talking angrily among
themselves before leaving school early.  Police focused their investi-
gation on Michael and his two friends, believing the fist fight to be
the motive for the deceased’s beating.
Police asked the high school principal to help them find
Michael.  The principal took them to Michael’s classroom, and police
went in, interrupted his class, and asked him to go with them to the
station.  Michael felt he had no choice but to go.  Once there, police
placed Michael in a 10x10 cinderblock room with a metal table, two
chairs, and a two-way mirror.  Michael had only seen a room like
this on TV.  The officer who escorted Michael into the room closed
the door behind him.  Michael sat in the chair furthest from the door.
He did not know whether the door was locked and was too afraid to
try the handle.  He did not know if his mother knew where he was.
Eventually, a detective entered the room.  He read Michael some
rights, but Michael did not really understand.  Michael believed that
if he told the detective the truth, everything would get straightened
out.  He told the detective that he was at home with his mother and
younger sister the night of the brutal beating.  The detective said he
didn’t believe him.  He implored Michael to take responsibility, tell-
ing him that “things would go easier for him” if he “simply told the
truth.”  The detective told him he understood how things could have
gotten “out of hand.” Michael was charged with first degree murder.
Given the seriousness of the charge, Michael was charged as an
adult and immediately taken to the adult county jail.11  Some county
facilities have separate accommodations for juveniles.  Michael’s
county jail did not.  Michael was housed among adult men who were
accused of violent crimes.  He went through the jail intake process—
was strip searched, fingerprinted, and his picture was taken.
He appeared in a video conference where a person, who he
thought was a Judge, read him his charges—first degree murder.  He
11. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2021).
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tried to tell the Judge that he had nothing to do with the crime.  The
Judge cut him off and said something about the nature of the of-
fense—”No Bail.”
Michael was assigned a cell.  His cell-mate was a 25-year-old
man awaiting trial for armed robbery of a convenience store.  He
seemed to know the jail pretty well.  For the most part, he stayed in
his cell.  He came out for headcount (because he had to) and to get
his tray of food.  He kept his head down; there were several fights on
his pod.  One, he thought, started over a chocolate pudding cup.  An-
other over someone staying on the phone too long.
It took five days for a lawyer to come see Michael.
III. CERTIFICATION/DECERTIFICATION.
Children may be punished for maintaining their innocence at
what may be the most critical stage of the juvenile justice process—
namely, transfer proceedings that determine whether a case will be
decided in juvenile or adult court.  In Pennsylvania, juveniles
charged with crimes generally have their cases proceed in juvenile
court; however, juveniles who are charged with murder or who are
over 15 years of age and accused of certain other offenses that are
exempted from the definition of “delinquent act” in the Juvenile
Act will have their cases proceed in adult court.12  Indeed, nation-
wide, “youth are routinely charged and prosecuted in the adult
criminal justice system.”13  If a case in Pennsylvania begins in juve-
nile court, the Commonwealth may seek to have it transferred to
adult court in a “certification” process.14  Conversely, if a case be-
gins in adult court, the accused child can seek to have it transferred
to juvenile court in a “decertification” process.15
This certification/decertification stage is critical given the
stakes for children who are prosecuted in adult court.  If incarcer-
ated before trial, they will likely be housed in adult jails as opposed
to being held in a juvenile detention facility if their case proceeded
in the juvenile system.  And, if convicted, they will face much more
severe penalties, including longer sentences and periods of supervi-
12. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2021) (defining delinquent act).
13. Issues: Youth Tried as Adults, JUV. L. CENTER, https://bit.ly/3cKIdbm
[https://perma.cc/E7GT-TE8Z] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021); see also, e.g., Nicole
Sciabba, Should Juveniles Be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice System?,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 3, 2016), https://bit.ly/2ORFcOI [https://perma.cc/PKP3-
DPA4] (discussing various state procedures for charging juveniles as adults and for
transferring cases to and from adult courts).
14. See 42 PA. Cons. Stat. § 6355 (2021) (governing transfer to criminal
proceedings).
15. See id. § 6322 (governing transfer from criminal proceedings).
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sion as well as incarceration in state prisons.  For example, in Com-
monwealth v. Taylor,16 15-year-old Nazeer Taylor was charged with
several sex offenses allegedly against his then 11-year-old foster
brother.  After a two-day hearing, all of his charges were trans-
ferred from the juvenile to state adult court.  If his case had stayed
in the juvenile system, Taylor would have been offered treatment
and jurisdiction would have ended automatically at age 21.  Instead,
after being tried and convicted in adult court, Taylor was subject to
a minimum of 35 years of supervision, including as much as 25 years
of incarceration in adult state prison.17  At least one court has
stated that “the certification of a juvenile offender to adult court
has been accurately characterized as the worst punishment the juve-
nile system is empowered to inflict.”18
Judges have broad discretion in determining whether cases
should be transferred to or from adult court.19  In exercising that
discretion, the judge must consider whether “there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the public interest is served” by transferring
the case.20  Among the factors the Juvenile Act requires be consid-
ered in that analysis are “whether the child is amenable to treat-
ment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile” and “whether the
child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
court jurisdiction.”21
In conducting this analysis, courts appear to place significant
weight on whether children accepted responsibility for the offenses
with which they were charged; if they did not, they were deter-
mined not to be amenable to rehabilitation.  Although the Juvenile
Act was passed in 1972 and has existed in its current form since
16. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 230 A.3d 1050, 1053 (Pa. 2020).
17. Id. at 1057–58.
18. Ramona R. v. Superior Ct., 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted).  In this case, if the accused child’s case had pro-
ceeded in juvenile court, she likely would not have been confined past her twenty-
fifth birthday; in adult court, she faced a potential life sentence for murder. Id.
19. See, e.g., Taylor, 230 A.3d at 1071 (“We recognize that the Juvenile Act
vests with the juvenile court a substantial degree of discretion within which to ad-
judge whether jurisdiction over a minor should be retained or should be trans-
ferred to an adult court for criminal prosecution.”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 26
A.3d 485, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (internal citations omitted) (“The ultimate
decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the sole
discretion of a decertification court.  This Court will not overturn a decision to
grant or deny decertification absent a gross abuse of discretion.”).
20. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4) (2021).
21. Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G), (G)(VII).
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1995,22 it is only within the last 10 years that Pennsylvania’s appel-
late courts have made clear that acceptance of responsibility cannot
be required at the certification/decertification stage.
In Commonwealth v. Brown,23 decided in 2011, a child charged
with committing a murder when he was 11 years old sought decer-
tification of his case from adult court to juvenile court.24  He main-
tained his innocence in interviews with psychologists retained by
the Commonwealth and the defense.25  The court denied decertifi-
cation, finding persuasive the reasoning of the Commonwealth’s
psychologist that because the child “would not take responsibility
for his actions,” “the prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile
court jurisdiction [was] likely to be unsuccessful.”26  The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court concluded that, by conditioning its conclu-
sion that the child was not amenable to treatment on the fact that
the child did not admit guilt, the court violated the child’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.27
Within the last year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up
the question of what role, if any, acceptance of responsibility should
play in the certification/decertification process.  In Commonwealth
v. Taylor, the minor did not admit to the delinquent acts with which
he was charged, and the juvenile court granted the Common-
wealth’s motion to transfer the case to adult court.28  The Supreme
Court adopted Brown’s reasoning and finally made clear that:
Simply put, a minor’s refusal to confess to an act for which he or
she might be criminally prosecuted may not be considered when
deciding whether to certify a case for transfer between juvenile
and adult court.  This remains true irrespective of the necessary
considerations of amenability to treatment contemplated by the
Juvenile Act or of the possibility of immunity contained therein.
22. See PA. JUV. CT. JUDGES’ COMM’N, PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY BENCHBOOK, §§ 3.2–3.3 (2018), https://bit.ly/2Ngm9g8 [https://perma.cc/
6PZM-N5SE].
23. Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
24. Id. at 489.
25. Id. at 489–90.
26. Id. at 490 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Id. at 510; see also id. at 506 (“Here, by finding that Appellant had to
admit guilt or accept responsibility for his actions as a condition to proving that he
was amenable to treatment, the trial court placed Appellant in a situation that
needlessly encouraged Appellant to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination.  As a result of the choice posed by the trial court, Appellant
could either incriminate himself and possibly receive transfer to the juvenile sys-
tem or not incriminate himself and face trial in the criminal system.  In order for
Appellant to obtain transfer to juvenile court and receive a lesser sentence for the
same offenses, Appellant . . . would have to forego his constitutional rights.”).
28. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 230 A.3d 1050, 1053–54 (Pa. 2020).
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As there is no way to guarantee that certification would be de-
nied, or decertification granted, upon an admission of guilt, a mi-
nor cannot be expected to take so broad a leap of faith.29
Given the recency of these decisions, and the continued pres-
ence of language regarding amenability to treatment and rehabilita-
tion in the transfer sections of the Juvenile Act, it remains to be
seen whether children who maintain their innocence will truly suf-
fer no adverse consequences for doing so in the certification/decer-
tification context.  This is particularly true because the
Pennsylvania appellate courts have not yet decided what relief may
be available to a juvenile whose refusal to confess is held against
him or her during the certification/decertification process. Taylor
left this question open for consideration by the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court, concluding:
[w]e reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for
a determination, in the first instance, and with developed advo-
cacy of the parties, of whether the harmless error doctrine is ap-
plicable to the juvenile court’s constitutionally deficient
misapplication of the Juvenile Act’s transfer provisions and, if it
is not or if the error is not harmless, for consideration of the
available relief under these circumstances.30
If the harmless error doctrine applies, the possibility remains
that children’s rights in this regard may still be violated without a
strong remedy.
Continued Case Example:
As soon as the lawyer sat down, he began to tell Michael about a
thing called a “Decertification” hearing, explaining that it was the
only way to get him transferred back to juvenile court where instead
of life in prison he could receive “treatment.”  “Treatment for what?”
Michael thought.  “I didn’t do anything.”  The lawyer told him that
a psychologist with specialized training in the adolescent brain would
come to the jail to interview him to make sure that he would be “ame-
nable to treatment.”  Then the lawyer got up to leave.  Michael spoke
up, “What if I didn’t do this? What if I am innocent?”  The lawyer
said:
Look, you are facing first degree murder charges.  Do you un-
derstand what that means?  It’s very, very serious.  You could spend
the rest of your life in prison.  Here in Pennsylvania life in prison
without the possibility of parole means–Life In Prison.  You will
29. Id. at 1072 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 1073.
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never get out.  My advice is that you cooperate with the psychologist.
You have a fairly clean record.  I think we can make a good argu-
ment for decertification.  You are 17 now, right?  The juvenile system
can only maintain jurisdiction until you are 21.  That means at most
you will serve 4 years in a juvenile detention facility.  When you get
out you would have the rest of your life ahead of you.  A trial in
criminal court is just not worth the risk . . . .
Michael went back to his cell.  Life in prison—for something he
didn’t do.  How was this happening?  Could he do four years in a
juvenile facility?  Could he say he did something he didn’t do—killed
someone—beat someone to death with a baseball bat?
Two days later the psychologist came to the jail see him.  She
wore a grey suit and glasses.  She asked him questions about his
childhood, his little sister, and his mom.  She asked him how often
and for how much time he and his sister were left at home alone.  His
mom has to work to support the family he explained.  He hated it.
He didn’t know this woman.  Who was she to judge him and his
family?  His mom wouldn’t have liked her either—she was nosey.
After talking to the lawyer, he was afraid to tell her that he didn’t do
this.  If he did, would this ruin his chances of being sent back to
juvenile court?  Did he have to accept responsibility in order to be
“amenable to treatment”?  Treatment he didn’t need!  His head hurt.
“F$%# this, I didn’t do this . . . I DON’T NEED TREAT-
MENT.”  Michael yelled.  Wide-eyed, the psychologist put her fold-
ers and papers away.  She slid her chair from the table and left the
room.  Michael held his head in his hands and listened to her heels
echo as they clicked down the hall.
Two weeks later, a correctional officer woke Michael at 4 a.m.
and told him to get ready to be transported to court.  Once there, he
sat in a holding cell in the basement of the courthouse for hours.
Eventually, the lawyer came down to talk to him.  He was allowed to
leave the holding cell and sit inside a smaller cage with the lawyer.
He explained that the psychologist’s report “did not come out well.”
The lawyer had to argue to the Judge that it was in the “public’s best
interest” for Michael to be decertified.  Unfortunately, given the bru-
tality of the offense and the fact that Michael lost his temper during
the evaluation, the psychologist recommended that the court move
forward with adult criminal charges.
Michael was brought up to the courtroom.  The psychologist tes-
tified.  She talked about Michael’s home life and his “deep loyalty” to
his family and friends—as if that was a bad thing.  She also described
Michael’s “outburst” during her interview.  Based on the psycholo-
gist’s testimony, his motion for decertification was DENIED.
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IV. PLEAS.
According to the National Juvenile Defender Center, “[t]he
majority of cases filed in delinquency court are resolved through a
plea agreement.”31  The pressures to forego trial and to give up on a
claim of innocence may therefore be even stronger in the juvenile
setting.  Research suggests that innocent children in juvenile court
may be particularly likely to plead guilty, tracking with research
which indicates that juveniles are also particularly susceptible to
false confessions.32
Continued Case Example:
A few weeks after the decertification hearing, the lawyer came
back to the county jail to see Michael.  He said even though the
decertification hearing went badly he had some “good news.”  The
District Attorney had offered Michael and his co-defendants a “plea
deal”—plead GUILTY to third degree murder.  In exchange, the pros-
ecutor would seek a “guideline sentence,” but because of the brutality
of the crime, the prosecutor would be asking the Judge to sentence all
three boys in the “aggravated range” along with a long tail of
probation.
The lawyer looked pleased with himself.
He explained that because Michael had never been in serious
trouble before, his prior record score was low.  He kept referring to
Michael as a “zero.”  Michael’s head was spinning.  The lawyer said
that, even in the aggravated range, Michael was probably looking at
no more than a 21/2- to 5-year sentence, although he warned the Judge
could sentence Michael all the way up to the statutory maximum—
which for third degree murder was 40 years.
WHAT??  Michael didn’t understand—plead guilty to some-
thing he didn’t do?  Possibly spend the next 5 to 40 years in a prison?
No, Michael shook his head.
The lawyer looked confused.  Michael told him he could not
plead guilty to something he didn’t do.  “If you go to trial and lose,
the lawyer said, you will spend the rest of your life in prison!  Take
the plea—it’s a good deal.”
“Tell the prosecutor I said, No.”  Michael went back to his cell.
He did not commit this crime; there was no way they could convict
him.
31. Pleas, NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., https://bit.ly/3qL9ShF [https://perma.cc/
TA33-VXBF] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
32. Redlich & Shteynberg, supra note 3, at 613, 622–23 (“juveniles are over-
represented in proven false confession cases.”).
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Eight months later, Michael went to trial facing first degree mur-
der charges along with his two co-defendants.  The prosecution al-
leged that the three boys were so infuriated by the injuries suffered by
their friend that they took matters into their own hands.  They left
school early, got ski masks from their homes, stole baseball bats
from the baseball fieldhouse to which they had access, and waited for
the deceased near the basketball court—a popular local hangout.
The Commonwealth conceded that no physical evidence tied the
three boys to the crime and that its case rose and fell on eyewitness
identification and circumstantial evidence—namely, the boys’ con-
nection to the baseball team.  The Commonwealth had executed
search warrants on all three boys’ homes and did not locate any of
the clothing, baseball bats, or ski masks believed to be used during
the assault.
After six hours of deliberation, the jury convicted all three boys.
The Judge immediately sentenced all three to the mandatory sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole.  Michael appealed
his conviction—it was summarily denied.  Michael believed he would
probably never have a chance to prove his innocence or even to re-
turn home on parole.  He kept appealing anyway, fighting for justice.
V. “JUVENILE LIFER” RESENTENCING.
In Pennsylvania, life means life.  In other words, individuals
convicted of first- or second-degree murder are subject to
mandatory life without parole—a sentence with no chance of re-
lease.33  For decades, this sentencing scheme applied to those who
were juveniles at the time of the crimes they were alleged to have
committed, as well as to adults.  As of 2016, in Pennsylvania, 514
people convicted of crimes they committed, or allegedly committed,
as children were incarcerated for life without parole; the vast ma-
jority of these “juvenile lifers” were from Philadelphia County.34
In 2012, these juvenile lifers finally received a glimmer of hope.
In Miller v. Alabama,35 the United States Supreme Court held that
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are unconsti-
tutional because they violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.36  The Court recognized that
33. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(a)–(b) (2021).
34. Samantha Melamed, Innocent—and Stuck in Prison for Life? Philly Juve-
nile Lifers Face a Catch 22, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/3cmYt2d.
35. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
36. Id. at 465.
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“children are different”37 and are entitled to individualized sentenc-
ing determinations, noting that “juveniles have diminished culpabil-
ity and greater prospects for reform.”38
A few years later, the Court decided in Montgomery v. Louisi-
ana39 that its decision in Miller applied retroactively.40  The Court
thus opened the door to re-sentencing for any juvenile with a
mandatory life without parole sentence, even those sentenced
before Miller was decided.  The Court confirmed that “[t]he oppor-
tunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate the
truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even
heinous crimes are capable of change.”41
Pennsylvania’s hundreds of juvenile lifers prepared for re-sen-
tencing, many having served decades believing they had no chance
of ever returning home.  However, the justice system once again
punished those who maintained their innocence.  In Common-
wealth v. Bryant,42 decided years before Miller and Montgomery,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “the orderly administra-
tion of justice requires” that guilt-phase claims—in other words,
claims for relief based on constitutional errors at trial or on new
evidence of innocence—be addressed before “the imposition of a
new sentence by the trial court.”43  Based on this decision, Penn-
sylvania courts refused to re-sentence juvenile lifers pursuant to
Miller and Montgomery if they were still pursuing claims for post-
conviction relief based on their innocence.  Suddenly, rather than
looking forward to the opportunity to return home, innocent juve-
nile lifers faced an incredibly difficult decision—should they give up
their innocence claims in exchange for a prompt re-sentencing, or
should they pursue them, knowing it could mean years or even de-
cades more spent in prison serving an illegal sentence?44
Some juvenile lifers contemplated abandoning their innocence
claims as they watched others going home who admitted their
guilt.45  Others said they would continue to fight to clear their
names, no matter what.  One juvenile lifer, Robert Outlaw, stated
in a 2018 interview with the Philadelphia Inquirer,
37. Id. at 481.
38. Id. at 471.
39. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
40. Id. at 736.
41. Id.
42. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 780 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2001).
43. Id. at 648.
44. Melamed, supra note 34.
45. Id.
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“I’m going to have to exhaust my remedies, and that’s that,” he
said.  “I’m passionate that I didn’t do it, and whatever hardships
I’m going to face with that, that’s what it’s going to be.  At the
end of the day . . . I’m just not going in there admitting guilt for
something that I didn’t do.”46
For those who proceeded to re-sentencing, they did so with the
understanding that, if they maintained their innocence, they would
likely receive harsher sentences than those who admitted guilt be-
cause acceptance of responsibility and showing remorse are factors
considered in the re-sentencing process.47  And, even when they be-
came parole eligible, the Parole Board likely would also fault them
for failing to accept responsibility.48
Continued Case Example:
Michael continued to fight to prove his innocence, including
writing to the Pennsylvania Innocence Project.
In 2011, several issues came to light with how the case was inves-
tigated and the way in which the eyewitness identifications were ob-
tained.  Through post-conviction investigation, Michael learned that
his picture was not merely selected from a photo array but that police
had shown his picture to witnesses and asked specifically whether
they had seen him anywhere near school grounds on the night of the
victim’s death.  Initially, no one identified Michael as being present.
It was not until several days later that a witness who had already been
shown Michael’s photograph selected Michael’s photo from the ar-
ray.  Moreover, this witness’s original description of the person she
saw that night did not match her trial testimony or Michael’s physical
appearance at the time.  Her original police report, however, was not
turned over to defense counsel in discovery prior to trial.  Michael
filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) Petition alleging various
46. Id. (alteration in original).  Since the men profiled in the Inquirer article
were interviewed, three (Robert Outlaw, Theophalis Wilson, and Terrance Lewis)
have been exonerated and one (David Sparks) has been re-sentenced and contin-
ues to push for exoneration. See Robert “Donald” Outlaw, PA. INNOCENCE PRO-
JECT, https://bit.ly/30DVVaB [https://perma.cc/FS9P-4Y8B] (last visited Jan. 15,
2021); Theophalis Wilson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://bit.ly/
3taDqXt [https://perma.cc/MJ2S-35M6] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021); Terrance Lewis,
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://bit.ly/2OnRVsc [https://perma.cc/
TJY4-MN9C] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021); Commonwealth v. Sparks, CP-51-CR-
0001327-2007 (Phila. Cnty. Ct. Com. Pl.).  The Pennsylvania Innocence Project
represents Mr. Outlaw and Mr. Sparks.
47. Pennsylvania Innocence Project interviews with juvenile lifers.
48. See supra note 19 (discussing requirement of acceptance of responsibility
in parole process).
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violations of his constitutional rights and was appointed an attorney
to represent him.
While Michael’s case was ongoing, in June 2012, the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding that the mandatory
imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole for a
juvenile convicted of murder was unconstitutional.  In 2013,
Michael’s attorney amended his PCRA petition to include his juve-
nile life without parole resentencing claims.  Michael learned that he
was just one of about 500 such cases in Pennsylvania.
Five long years later in fall 2017, Michael’s case was finally
scheduled for a hearing with the court.  Unfortunately, when the
Judge finally took the bench, he flatly told Michael’s attorney that the
court was not resentencing anyone who still had “freestanding claims
of innocence” or “guilt-phase claims”—as Michael did.  The lawyer
explained that this left Michael with two choices: (1) give up his inno-
cence and guilt-phase PCRA claims (i.e. the issues with the investiga-
tion and eyewitness identifications) and proceed directly to
resentencing in the hopes that the Judge would have mercy on him
and make him immediately parole eligible or (2) continue to fight to
prove his innocence with no guarantee that he would be successful
and hope that he does not anger the resentencing Judge in the pro-
cess.  Michael’s lawyer also warned that he had heard rumors that
those individuals who maintained their innocence during resentenc-
ing were being “hit” with a two-year failure to take responsibility
penalty from resentencing judges.  So, even if he decided to give up
his fight to prove his innocence—something he had been doing for
nearly two decades now—again, he was faced with the prospect of
having to take responsibility for a crime he did not commit.
Michael knew that post-conviction litigation could take years
without any guarantee of success.  A friend of his while incarcerated
actually had a federal magistrate Judge write in an opinion that he
was most likely “actually innocent” of the crime but nonetheless deny
relief due to “procedural” barriers.  Michael had no illusions that be-
ing innocent mattered . . . once convicted the only thing that mattered
was maintaining the conviction.
The Commonwealth made Michael an offer—in exchange for
dropping all of his guilt-phase and freestanding innocence claims, it
would recommend a sentence of 22 years to life, but the Judge would
not be bound by the recommendation.  If the Judge sentenced
Michael to the recommended 22 years to life, he would be eligible for
parole very soon.  However, if the Judge departed from the recom-
mendation, Michael could be facing something as high as the current
statutory sentence of 35 years to life, meaning it would be many years
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before he was parole eligible.  Additionally, should he receive a mi-
nor infraction for anything after being re-sentenced, his first parole
hearing could be delayed by up to one additional year.  Those would
be wasted years that he could have been fighting to prove or maybe
even have proved his innocence and been home with his family.  OR
maybe not, and if he kept fighting, he could end up spending more
time behind bars then he would have by accepting the deal.  Which
was the right decision?
This account demonstrates that juveniles appear to be penal-
ized for maintaining their innocence from the initial decisions re-
garding whether they will accept a plea to later decisions about
whether their cases will proceed in adult or juvenile court, and
whether and when they will be re-sentenced if eligible under Miller
and Montgomery.
VI. WHY IS THE “INNOCENCE PENALTY” WORSE IN THE
JUVENILE CONTEXT?
If, as it appears, the “innocence penalty” particularly affects
those charged with crimes as juveniles, the question then becomes
why.  There is one commonsense answer—children have fewer
tools at their disposal to make strategic decisions as their cases pro-
ceed through the criminal justice system.  More significantly, there
is evidence of a systemic answer as well that is rooted in the very
nature of the juvenile justice system.
A stated purpose of Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act is “to provide
for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision,
care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the pro-
tection of the community, the imposition of accountability for of-
fenses committed and the development of competencies to enable
children to become responsible and productive members of the
community.”49  In keeping with this, Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Justice
Mission Statement is:  “Juvenile Justice: Community Protection;
Victim Restoration; Youth Redemption.”50  “Youth Redemption
embodies the belief that juvenile offenders in Pennsylvania have
49. 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (2021) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., In
re B.T.C., 868 A.2d 1203, 1204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Further, one of the purposes
of the Juvenile Act is hold children accountable for their behavior.”); In re J.C.,
751 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“This section [42 Pa. C.S. § 6301(b)(2)]
evidences the Legislature’s clear intent to protect the community while rehabilitat-
ing and reforming juvenile delinquents.”).
50. PA. JUV. CT. JUDGES’ COMM’N, supra note 22, at § 2.2 (emphasis added).
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strengths, are capable of change, can earn redemption, and can be-
come responsible and productive members of their communities.”51
The goals of rehabilitation and redemption thus undergird the
entire structure of Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system.  Both con-
cepts are grounded in the idea that someone has done something
wrong but can change or be redeemed.  For example, Merriam-
Webster defines rehabilitation as “the process of restoring someone
(such as a criminal) to a useful and constructive place in society.”52
It defines redemption as “the act, process, or an instance of re-
deeming,”53 and “redeem,” in turn, is defined as “to release from
blame or debt, to free from the consequences of sin, to change for
the better, [to] restore . . . .”54  While these are laudable and neces-
sary goals by themselves, they do not leave much room for the con-
sideration of potential innocence.  The focus of goals centered upon
fixing people in the juvenile justice system operates on a presump-
tion that the children in the system are broken—a presumption that
does not allow for consideration of whether a child maintaining in-
nocence is telling the truth.
The Brown and Taylor cases discussed above highlight this
problem with the early stages of the juvenile processes’ emphasis on
amenability to rehabilitation and redemption—the possibility that a
child who maintains his or her innocence may be doing so credibly
does not seem to be considered.  While further analysis of the ques-
tion posed here—whether the innocence penalty particularly affects
children—is certainly required, in our view, creating space for dia-
logue concerning potential innocence when we talk about the juve-
nile justice system is a necessary first step.  Only when attorneys
and judges are willing to consider this possibility can they assess
claims of innocence by children in an unbiased way.  Ultimately,
true justice requires moving away from a system that almost rou-
tinely allows innocent children to be tried in adult court and away
from statutory language requiring the imposition of accountability.
51. Id. at § 2.3.
52. Rehabilitation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/38xwyeS [https://
perma.cc/V7LR-K4YZ] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
53. Redemption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/3evvGLJ [https://
perma.cc/6ARH-54UL] (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
54. Redeem, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/30Ce3BK [https://perma.cc/
S7WN-6MTE] (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
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